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MITOCHONDRIAL DNA:
EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES
*

Edward K. Cheng
INTRODUCTION

Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is an exciting and important
new development in forensic technology.1 Compared with
traditional nuclear DNA (nDNA) analysis, mtDNA offers three
primary benefits.2 First, its structure and location in the cell make
mtDNA more stable, enabling investigators to test old or degraded
samples.3 Second, mtDNA is available in larger quantities per cell,

*

Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. J.D., Harvard Law
School; M.Sc., London School of Economics; B.S.E., Princeton University. This
paper was presented at the Science for Judges III conference held at Brooklyn
Law School on March 26 and 27, 2004. I would like to thank Margaret Berger
for the invitation to present at the conference and her continued support, and
Melissa Ballard for excellent research assistance.
1
The first use of mtDNA in a criminal case was in 1996 in Tennessee. See
Mark Curriden, A New Evidence Tool: First Use of Mitochondrial DNA Test in
a U.S. Criminal Trial, 82 A.B.A. J. 18, at 18 (1996). See also Julian Adams,
Nuclear and Mitochondrial DNA in the Courtroom, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 69 (2005).
2
See generally Marlan D. Walker, Mitochondrial DNA Evidence in State v.
Pappas, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 427, 428–31 (2003) (discussing the admissibility of
mtDNA evidence in court, the scientific principles underlying it, and the
laboratory procedures involved).
3
Alice R. Isenberg, Forensic Mitochondrial DNA Analysis: A Different
Crime-Solving Tool, 71 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 8, at 16 (2002) (noting that
mtDNA’s location in the cell and its circular structure “protect[] it from
deterioration”); Charlotte J. Word, The Future of DNA Testing and Law
Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 249, 251 (2001) (reporting mtDNA’s use in
post-conviction cases and other cases in which samples are very old).
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enabling the testing of smaller samples.4 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, mtDNA can be extracted from samples in which
nDNA cannot, specifically bone fragments and hair shafts.5
At the same time, however, the evidentiary weight of mtDNA
is not equivalent to that of nDNA. While the laboratory techniques
involved in analyzing the two types of DNA are nearly identical,
their probative values are quite different. For example, unlike with
nDNA, maternal relatives share identical copies of mtDNA, so
mtDNA is not a unique identifier.6 In addition, because mtDNA is
still in its infancy as a forensic tool, definitive population statistics
are not yet available on the various alleles (or sequences). This
issue is sure to dissipate as mtDNA databanks become larger and
more comprehensive but, until then, the probative value of an
mtDNA “match” may be somewhat ambiguous.
This article will briefly survey some of the current and
emerging legal issues surrounding mtDNA evidence. Parts I and II
discuss basic evidentiary questions, including mtDNA’s reliability
and admissibility under Daubert7 as well as the potential problem
of jury confusion regarding the probative value of mtDNA. Part III
considers the broader potential of mtDNA to supplant microscopic
hair analysis, a technique often criticized for its subjectivity and
high error rate. Finally, Part IV explores the unique privacy
concerns raised by the maternal inheritance of mtDNA,
specifically in the context of DNA databanks.

4

State v. Council, 515 S.E.2d 508, 516 & n.12 (S.C. 1999).
United States v. Coleman, 202 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965 (E.D. Mo. 2002)
(observing that bone and hair shafts can be tested for mtDNA); Word, supra
note 3, at 251 (noting the use of mtDNA in testing hair shafts and dried bones
because they cannot be tested for nDNA).
6
See Walker, supra note 2, at 429 (discussing the maternal inheritance of
mtDNA); Isenberg, supra note 3, at 16 (noting that mtDNA is strictly inherited
from the maternal line).
7
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 585-97 (1993) (holding
that the general acceptance of a scientific technique is not a precondition for
admission of expert testimony based upon that technique so long as the
standards of reliability and relevance under the Federal Rules of Evidence are
met).
5
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I. RELIABILITY
Is mtDNA sufficiently reliable to be admissible? For courts
across the country, the answer has been a clear and resounding yes.
A glance at recent case law shows that mtDNA has quickly gained
judicial approval in both federal and state courts.8 Indeed,
admissibility has become so common that the number of
admissibility hearings for mtDNA has decreased substantially in
recent years.9
A significant minority of states have statutorily declared DNA
evidence admissible,10 and a number of courts have taken judicial
8

E.g., United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 530 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting mtDNA);
Coleman, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 970 (holding mtDNA to be clearly scientific and
admissible); State v. Pappas, 776 A.2d 1091, 1111 (Conn. 2001) (upholding trial
court’s admission of mtDNA); Wagner v. State, No. 2034, 2005 WL 14913, at
*5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 3, 2005) (same); People v. Holtzer, 660 N.W.2d
405, 410 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (“[T]he case for mtDNA is strengthening with
time, not weakening.”); Adams v. State, 794 So. 2d 1049, 1065 (Miss. Ct. App.
2001) (holding that mtDNA satisfied all procedural safeguards); State v.
Underwood, 518 S.E.2d 231, 240 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding the trial
court’s admission of mtDNA); State v. Council, 515 S.E.2d 508, 518 (S.C.
1999); State v. Scott, 33 S.W.3d 746, 759 (Tenn. 2000) (finding mtDNA
covered by a state statute declaring DNA evidence admissible). See generally 3
DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 25-1.2.1 (2d ed.
2003) (cataloging mtDNA admissibility decisions); CONSTANCE L. FISHER ET
AL., LAB. DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, PUBLICATION NO. 01-05,
MITOCHONDRIAL DNA: TODAY AND TOMORROW 2 (2001) (reporting that
mtDNA evidence is admissible in 26 states: Alabama, Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, and West Virginia); Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of
Intellectual Due Process: A Primer for Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1563, 1656 n.542 (2000) (citing Leigh Jones, Type of DNA Ruled Reliable in
Rape Trial, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 7, 2000, at 1) (stating that Maryland, Michigan,
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and the Eastern District of
Ohio have found mtDNA to be reliable).
9
FISHER, supra note 8, at 2 (noting that admissibility hearings concerning
mtDNA have fallen off in recent years).
10
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86k(a) (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

CHENG MACROED FINAL 2-18-05.DOC

102

3/7/2005 7:52 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

notice of new DNA techniques.11 Stretching these determinations
to cover mtDNA automatically, however, is probably unwise.12
Like all new technologies, mtDNA should be assessed on its own
terms and not merely “lump[ed] together” with existing forms of
DNA identification because it technically fits within the language
of an admissibility statute or governing precedent.13
That said, however, courts have good reasons to accept
mtDNA.14 As a forensic tool with applications beyond litigation,
mtDNA has been employed in nonadversarial contexts, such as the
identification of historical remains,15 war crime victims,16 and the

29, § 4713(a) (2004); IND. CODE. ANN. § 35-37-4-13(b) (West 2004); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 634.25 (West 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-13-02 (2003); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 24-7-118(b)(1) (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.5 (Michie
2004); see also Scott, 33 S.W.3d at 757–58 & n.10 (reporting states that, as of
2000, had enacted DNA admissibility statutes).
11
United States v. Coleman, 202 F. Supp. 2d 962, at 968 (E.D. Mo. 2002)
(noting that the Eighth Circuit takes judicial notice of the reliability of various
nDNA techniques); see also United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1445 (8th
Cir. 1996) (taking judicial notice of DNA-PCR).
12
But see Scott, 33 S.W.3d at 758–59 (holding that the state’s DNA
admissibility statute applied to mtDNA and refusing to hold an admissibility
hearing because the statute made the reliability issue moot).
13
See, e.g., 3 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at § 25-1.2.1 (arguing that
“one should not lump all forms of DNA identification together” and that the
principles of each new technology should be examined afresh for compliance
with scientific reliability standards); Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye,
DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 459 (2001)
(arguing that prior acceptance of another DNA methodology “does not dictate
the conclusion that the court also must accept . . . mitochondrial DNA
sequencing”); see also Coleman, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 965–66 (noting that mtDNA
has had “little judicial scrutiny”).
14
See Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings:
Questions Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1137
(2003) (suggesting that mtDNA clearly meets the Daubert standard).
15
David H. Kaye & George F. Sensabaugh, Jr., Reference Guide on DNA
Evidence, in ANNOTATED REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCI. EVIDENCE 485, 493–97
(David L. Faigman et al., eds., 2004) (citing Peter Gill et al., Identification of the
Remains of the Romanov Family by DNA Analysis, 6 NATURE GENETICS 130
(1994)).
16
Ana Marusic, DNA Lab Helps Identify Missing Persons in Croatia and
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victims of the September 11th attacks.17 More importantly,
mtDNA testing rests on essentially the same principles and
procedures that underlie nDNA testing,18 a technique now
universally regarded as reliable.19 Mitochondrial DNA laboratories
have benefited from years of acquired wisdom in handling and
processing nDNA, so even early on, many mtDNA labs had the
protocols, standards, and proficiency testing necessary to ensure
reliability.20
As with other forms of expert evidence, the mtDNA testing
performed in a particular case can be challenged. Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 requires that expert evidence not only be the
“product of reliable principles and methods,” but also that those
principles and methods be applied “reliably to the facts of the
case.”21 Thus, while mtDNA evidence may be sound as a general

Bosnia and Herzegovina, 358 LANCET 1243 (2001) (reporting the use of nDNA
and mtDNA for identifying persons in the Balkans); see also Beecher-Monas,
supra note 8, at 1651 (reporting that mtDNA was used to identify bodies in the
Balkans and the body of Tsar Nicholas II).
17
Coleman, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 969–70; Bill Scanlon, A Fast, Cheap DNA
Match; Denver Scientists Develop New Way to Analyze Genetics, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 13, 2002, at 8B.
18
Coleman, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 969 (noting that the mtDNA process is the
same as nDNA); id. (quoting Dr. Terry Melton, President of Mitotyping
Technologies) (reporting that mtDNA involves the same machine and principles
as nDNA).
19
Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 414 (suggesting that any question about
the “validity of forensic [nuclear] DNA testing has largely dissipated”).
20
U.S. v. Coleman, 202 F. Supp. 2d 962, at 969 (E.D. Mo. 2002)
(discussing the six weeks of validation studies used at a major mtDNA
laboratory and the use of peer review since 1991); Berger, supra note 14, at
1134 (observing that the same laboratories perform mtDNA and nDNA testing).
On the issue of peer review, Emory University has compiled a comprehensive
listing of published mtDNA articles. See D.C. Wallace & M.T. Lott, References
of Mitochondrial Interest, at http://www.mitomap.org/mitomap/biglist.html (last
visited Feb. 2, 2005).
21
FED. R. EVID. 702 (2004); Coleman, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (noting that
judicial notice does not end the admissibility inquiry and that the court can still
look into whether the techniques were properly performed); Beecher-Monas,
supra note 8, at 1652–54 (discussing the importance of checking the
methodology used in mtDNA).
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matter, the well-accepted procedures underlying mtDNA testing
may be improperly applied in a given case.22 Some courts,
however, have classified case-specific problems as going to weight
rather than admissibility23—a practice often observed in traditional
DNA cases.24
II. PROBATIVE VALUE
Although the procedures for extracting and sequencing mtDNA
are essentially the same as those used in traditional nDNA testing,
the probative value of mtDNA evidence is quite different.25
A. Population Frequencies
Unlike nDNA, mtDNA sequences are commonly shared by
multiple persons in the population.26 The frequency of the most
22

3 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at § 25.1.2.1 (criticizing the decision in
Sheckells v. State, No. 05-00-00660-CR., 2001 WL 1178828 (Tex. Ct. App.
Oct. 8, 2001) (unpublished opinion) for not addressing the case-specific
weaknesses raised by the defense, including the mtDNA expert’s incompetence
and sloppiness).
23
E.g., Wagner v. State, No. 2034, 2005 WL 14913, at *6 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. Jan. 3, 2005) (holding that contamination issues “affect[] the weight of
mtDNA evidence, but [do] not automatically render mtDNA evidence
inadmissible); State v. Pappas, 776 A.2d 1091, 1109 (Conn. 2001) (same).
Contamination is almost always a risk in DNA testing, particularly when
samples are amplified using PCR, but laboratories have well-established
procedures to minimize the risk. FISHER, supra note 8.
24
Cf. Berger, supra note 14, at 1129 (reporting that “courts are now so
convinced that DNA evidence is admissible that they generally treat all
challenges as going to the weight of the evidence,” but arguing that exclusion
may be proper for extreme cases such as laboratory fraud).
25
See Adams, supra note 1.
26
Mitochondrial DNA is currently only sequenced within two
“hypervariable” regions, known as HV1 and HV2, which consist of 610 base
pairs; in comparison, modern nuclear DNA testing uses thirteen sequence areas.
See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, THE FUTURE OF
FORENSIC DNA TESTING: PREDICTIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
WORKING GROUP 19 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice 2000). Some commentators predict
that future developments in mtDNA technology will enable other regions to be
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common mtDNA sequence is approximately one in twenty-five,27
whereas the frequency of an nDNA profile is estimated at one in
ten billion.28
An mtDNA “match” is therefore clearly not the same as an
nDNA “match.”29 With a traditional, nuclear DNA match, the jury
can be reasonably certain that the biological material found at a
crime scene came from the matched party. With a mitochondrial
DNA match, however, contribution from the “matched” person is
only made more likely. 30 As such, finding the suspect’s mtDNA at
a crime scene operates more akin to finding the suspect’s blood
type or brand of cigarette. To be sure, mtDNA sequences, being
more uncommon, are more probative, but they are far less unique
than nuclear DNA.
This critical difference between mtDNA and nDNA can create
unfair prejudice problems. Defense attorneys may complain that
jury members will misinterpret the mtDNA evidence, ascribing to
it far more probative value than it deserves. Nonetheless, provided

tested, making mtDNA a more powerful identification tool. See Fisher, supra
note 8, at 4 (predicting the future use of single nucleotide polymorphisms—
single base pair differences—of which there are probably sixty sites).
27
Pappas, 776 A.2d at 1104; Berger, supra note 14, at 1135. Because
mtDNA is still in its infancy, the population frequency estimates are undergoing
constant revision as more samples are added to the database. Compare Berger,
supra note 14, at 1135 (reporting that, as of 2002, the most common sequence
had a frequency of 4%), with Fisher, supra note 8, at 3 (reporting in July 2000 a
frequency of 7%). Indeed, because the database size is still so small, Coleman,
202 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (reporting that the FBI database contained 4,142 entries
in 2002), the FBI does not provide official population frequency estimates, but
rather only reports absolute numbers (i.e., how many times the sequence appears
in the database), Isenberg, supra note 3, at 16. Statistical methods, however,
enable the calculation of the upper-bound for the estimated population
frequencies; these estimates will become more precise as the database grows. Id.
28
Berger, supra note 14, at 1128.
29
Exclusion, in contrast, works the same for mtDNA and nDNA. If a
suspect’s mtDNA or nDNA is different from the material recovered at the crime
scene, then the suspect is plainly excluded.
30
For this very reason, mtDNA experts generally testify only that the
suspect “cannot be excluded” from the pool of contributors, rather than use the
loaded term “match.”
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that jurors are sufficiently educated about mtDNA’s differences
and limitations, there is little reason why they could not
appropriately distinguish the two technologies.31
B. Maternal Relatives
A related complication is the problem of maternal relatives.
Each person’s nuclear DNA is a combination of paternal and
maternal DNA, ensuring that the nDNA profiles of family
members and relatives are distinguishable (albeit similar). Not so
for mtDNA, which is passed solely from mother to child.
Consequently, all maternal relatives share identical mtDNA and
thus cannot be distinguished from one another on this basis.32
This linkage issue can cause problems when maternal relatives
are also suspects. The presence of a known maternal relative can
change the probative value of mtDNA evidence significantly. For
one thing, the general population frequencies are no longer
applicable because the rarity of the mtDNA sequence is irrelevant
to a jury deciding between two maternal relatives.33
While maternal linkage may cause difficulties in rare instances,
it will not present a serious problem as a general matter. Provided
that jurors are made aware of the maternal linkage issue,34
mtDNA’s probative value will be in narrowing the pool of
potential suspects. The mtDNA evidence will thus be hardly
different from finding a straight black hair at the crime scene when
both relatives have straight black hair. Generally speaking, it will
be part of a broader body of evidence, and the other evidence will
31

U.S. v. Coleman, 202 F. Supp. 2d 962, at 970–71 (E.D. Mo. 2002)
(holding that no Rule 403 problem existed when an mtDNA expert’s testimony
explained that mtDNA cannot create an exact match).
32
Isenberg, supra note 3, at 17 (observing that mtDNA cannot establish a
precise match because of the maternal-relatives problem).
33
Berger, supra note 14, at 1135–36 (noting that population statistics are
not relevant if maternal relatives live nearby).
34
Defense attorneys naturally bear the primary responsibility for making
jurors aware of the limitations of mtDNA evidence. However, given the limited
availability of defense experts and defense attorneys’ potential lack of
familiarity with the technology, courts could require that mtDNA experts testify
about mtDNA’s limitations as a condition of admissibility.
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make one relative more likely to be the perpetrator than the others.
When such additional inculpatory evidence does not exist, courts
could justifiably decide that the mtDNA evidence, standing alone,
is insufficient for conviction.35
III. MICROSCOPIC HAIR ANALYSIS AND A “BEST SCIENCE” RULE
The scientific rigor that accompanies the mtDNA testing
process, coupled with the test’s ability to extract identifying
information from hair shafts, enables us to examine a slowly
developing issue in scientific evidence. On the whole, discussions
about scientific evidence have focused on Daubert, which
conceptually assesses scientific evidence on an absolute scale.
Either a forensic technology or scientific finding is “reliable,” or it
is not; there is little (overt) discussion about the relative merits of a
given technique vis-à-vis other available technologies.
This Part discusses the ramifications that mtDNA analysis may
have for the continued use and admissibility of traditional
microscopic hair analysis, which has been the subject of much
recent criticism. Pressing further, this article asks whether courts
might actually require mtDNA in the place of microscopic hair
analysis and speculates about the effects of applying a “Best
Science Rule” to the admission of scientific evidence generally.
A. Microscopic Hair Analysis
Microscopic hair analysis has been used since the nineteenth
35

Berger, supra note 14, at 1136 (noting reasonable doubt problems that
arise because of the possibility that a relative was the perpetrator). For example,
because microscopic hair analysis is similarly not conclusive of identity, some
courts have found that microscopy by itself is insufficient for a conviction. E.g.,
State v. Stallings, 334 S.E.2d 485, 486 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that
microscopy “must be combined with other substantial evidence to take a case to
the jury”); see also Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic
Hair Comparison Analysis: Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century
Snake Oil, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 227, 229, 291 nn.3-4 (1996)
(discussing Thompson v. State, 539 A.2d 1052, 1059 (Del. 1988), in which the
Delaware Supreme Court held microscopic hair comparisons insufficient for
establishing the probable cause necessary for an arrest warrant).
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century.36 As its name implies, it involves the comparison of the
microscopic attributes of hairs found at a crime scene with the
hairs of a suspect.37 For cases involving largely circumstantial
evidence, microscopy often can provide “decisive corroborative
evidence” as the one physical link between the defendant and the
victim or crime scene.38
In theory, the investigative power of microscopy works
similarly to that of mtDNA. If the compared hairs are clearly
different—for example, a blond, curly hair versus a straight, black
hair—common sense suggests that the potential suspect should be
excluded. In contrast, if the compared hairs share many
characteristics, then the suspect cannot be excluded and, indeed,
the evidence casts additional suspicion on him.
In practice, however, microscopy is a poor substitute for
mtDNA, and it has been much maligned for its subjectivity and
high error rates.39 Unlike mtDNA analysis, in which specific basepair sequences are compared, microscopic hair analysis lacks
objective criteria for determining whether two hairs are
“consistent.” Determining whether or not hairs are consistent is
therefore more art than science. The subjectivity inherent in
microscopic comparisons leaves the technique open to
36

BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES
WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT 208 (New American Library 2003)
(2000).
37
See Smith & Goodman, supra note 35, at 229 & n.22 (describing the
microscopy process and citing more substantial discussions of the technique).
38
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Hair Analysis: The Case Against the
Underemployment of Scientific Evidence, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 41, 42–43
(1982).
39
Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1555 (E.D. Okla. 1995);
Imwinkelried, supra note 38, at 43–44; see also John I. Thornton & Joseph L.
Peterson, The General Assumptions and Rationale of Forensic Identification, in
3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY § 24-9.2.3 (David L. Faigman et al., eds., 2d ed. 2002) (suggesting
that while microscopy is useful for excluding a suspect, “[i]n an inclusionary
mode . . . hair is a miserable form of evidence”); Craig M. Cooley, Reforming
the Forensic Science Community to Avert the Ultimate Injustice, 15 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 101, 158–60 app. A (forthcoming 2004) (cataloging wrongful capital
convictions involving microscopic hair analysis).
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inconsistencies among examiners and problems such as
expectation bias.40
The few studies41 on the reliability of microscopic hair analysis
have shown it to have extremely high error rates, perhaps in part
because of this subjectivity.42 A proficiency testing program in the
1970s reported 54% and 67% error rates, which are (remarkably)
worse than chance.43 A recent 2002 study showed that in nine
instances out of eighty in which hair was found consistent via
microscopy, further mtDNA analysis excluded the suspect.44
40

Expectation bias is created when hair examiners are only given one
suspect’s hair to compare. The suggestiveness of the procedure, which singles
out the comparison hair as suspicious, pushes examiners toward finding
consistencies. See Larry Miller, Procedural Bias in Forensic Science
Examinations of Human Hair, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 157 (1987) (showing that
forensic students had a 30.4% error rate when comparing hair, but also noting
that the error rate fell to 3.8% when a “lineup” procedure was used instead),
cited in Williamson, 904 F. Supp. at 1557 (noting the use of the conventional,
error-prone procedure in 1995).
41
Williamson, 904 F. Supp. at 1556 (observing the “scarcity of scientific
studies regarding the reliability of hair comparison testing”).
42
The two studies showing microscopy to have reasonable reliability,
performed by Canadian researchers in the 1970s, showed error rates of 1 in 4500
for scalp hair and 1 in 800 for pubic hair. B.D. Gaudette & E.S. Keeping, An
Attempt at Determining Probabilities in Human Scalp Hair Comparison, 19 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 599, 604-5 (1974) (scalp hair); B.D. Gaudette, Probabilities and
Human Pubic Hair Comparison, 21 J. FORENSIC SCI. 514, 516-17 (1976) (pubic
hair); see also Smith & Goodman, supra note 35, at 237–40 (discussing the
Gaudette conclusions in greater detail). The Gaudette studies were harshly
criticized for methodological problems, see Williamson, 904 F. Supp. at 1556–
57 (discussing “experimental bias”); Smith & Goodman, supra note 35, at 242–
43 (noting the lack of “double-blind” procedures), and, consequently, were not
widely embraced by the forensic community, Thornton & Peterson, supra note
39, at § 24-9.2.3 (noting that the Gaudette probability model has “received a
cool reception from the forensic science community”).
43
Imwinkelried, supra note 38, at 44.
44
Max M. Houck & Bruce Budowle, Correlation of Microscopic and
Mitochondrial DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1, 3 (2002). Houck
and Budowle emphasize that the nine cases should not be construed as false
positives, arguing that they merely show the limits of the forensic technique. Id.
This interpretation seems overly generous. While microscopic hair analysis
never purports to establish identity definitively, juries use its conclusions to
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Microscopic hair analysis has one other serious drawback. For
one reason or another, whether because of microscopy’s subjective
nature or because of a lack of interest in compiling a database,
well-accepted statistics do not exist on the distribution of various
types of hair in the population. As a result, experts confine
themselves to vague terms such as “consistent” or “similar.”45
While this lack of population statistics is less significant in cases in
which the opportunity for committing the crime is limited to only a
few individuals (because their hairs can all be compared), it
presents troubling issues when a wide pool of potential
perpetrators exists. In these latter cases, factfinders receive no
guidance as to what weight to give a finding of “consistent.”46
Unlike with observable traits such as hair color, factfinders have
no innate sense of the rarity or commonality of the trait in the
population.
Concededly, population statistics for mtDNA are currently
limited. However, as mentioned earlier, the mtDNA database is
rapidly expanding. As the sample size grows, increasingly reliable
statistics on the distribution of various mtDNA sequences will
become available.47
B. mtDNA as the “Better Science”
Theoretically, mitochondrial DNA is almost always available
as an alternative to microscopic hair analysis because both
techniques focus on the shaft of a recovered hair. Indeed, a recent
study suggests that mtDNA is actually a more powerful forensic
tool because it is able to make comparisons even when
assess whether the defendant’s involvement is more or less probable. For those
nine cases, hair analysis pointed in the wrong direction.
45
Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1554 (E.D. Okla. 1995)
(describing a microscopy expert’s testimony, which used terms such as
“consistent” and “could have the same source”); Imwinkelried, supra note 38, at
43 (noting growing criticism about the vague terms used by hair analysts).
46
Berger, supra note 14, at 1131 (arguing that microscopy cannot be
compared to blood-typing because blood types have accepted distributions,
whereas microscopy does not).
47
See supra note 27.
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microscopy’s results are inconclusive.48 Given this virtually perfect
overlap in scope and mtDNA’s advantages of greater objectivity,
lower error rates, and established population statistics, one suspects
that mtDNA will eventually supplant microscopy as the hair
analysis tool of choice.49 For example, the FBI claims that
microscopy is now used only in conjunction with mtDNA,50 with
microscopy perhaps serving as an initial filter before more
expensive mtDNA techniques are used.
Unfortunately, however, no such complete shift has yet
occurred,51 so the question becomes: what should be done in the
interim?
1. Daubert
Even before the use of mtDNA for criminal identification,
some courts, most notably the Eastern District of Oklahoma in
Williamson v. Reynolds,52 subjected microscopic hair analysis to a
searching reliability inquiry under Daubert.53 Later courts,
however, appear not to have taken up the cudgel.54 This result is
48

Houck & Budowle, supra note 44, at 2 (asserting that mtDNA can
achieve definitive results in many cases in which microscopy is inconclusive).
49
Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1047, 1057–58 (2003) (suggesting that microscopy may be
“waning” because mtDNA is thought to be more accurate and because both
techniques test the same physical evidence); Berger, supra note 14, at 1134–35
(summarizing the advantages of mtDNA and questioning the continued use of
microscopy in light of mtDNA).
50
Beecher-Monas, supra note 8, at 1649.
51
Friedman, supra note 49, at 1058 (acknowledging that both mtDNA and
microscopy are still in use).
52
904 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Okla. 1995).
53
Id. at 1558 (excluding microscopic hair analysis as unreliable).
54
E.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258, 262 (Ky. 1999)
(holding microscopy admissible and taking judicial notice of its reliability);
Bolin v. State, 960 P.2d 784, 799 (Nev. 1998) (holding that the trial court’s
admission of microscopy was not “manifestly wrong”); see also Paul C.
Giannelli, Scientific Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
103, 114 (2001) (“Unfortunately, later cases—even in Daubert jurisdictions—
have not continued the type of scrutiny [concerning microscopic hair analysis]
displayed by the district court in Williamson.”).
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easily explained: with no readily available alternatives, courts were
loath to exclude valuable hair evidence altogether.55 Having some
(albeit somewhat unreliable) hair evidence was preferable to
having no such physical evidence at all.56
Today, with mtDNA in its ascendancy, excluding microscopy
under Daubert might seem appealing, but Daubert is rather illfitted to the task. Daubert, with its focus on the reliability of
methods, is technically an absolute standard, so its operation
should not depend on the existence of other forms of evidence.57
Furthermore, it would be difficult to argue that microscopy is
entirely unreliable. Microscopic hair comparison is not
charlatanism that lacks any basis in reality. Hair indeed varies from
person to person, and the hairs on a single person share similar
characteristics. The problem with microscopy is that it is
suboptimal. Just because mtDNA is better does not make mtDNA
true science and microscopy snake oil.
2. A “Best Science” Rule
Courts interested in nudging forensic analysis away from
microscopy and toward mtDNA might wish to impose something
along the lines of a “best science” rule, an approach that would be
preferable to Daubert. Because mtDNA covers the same physical
evidence as and is more reliable than microscopy, courts could
proclaim mtDNA as the only admissible form of hair-related
evidence. Exceptions could be made only when there was a
specific finding that microscopy was particularly useful or
necessary in a given case.
55

See Friedman, supra note 49, at 1059, 1064 (suggesting that hair analysis
is extremely useful evidence, so even if it is somewhat unreliable, there is no
reason to keep it from the jury).
56
Imwinkelried, supra note 38, at 65 (arguing that the outright exclusion of
scientific evidence may not be desirable because it would create greater
dependence on traditional forms of evidence, such as eyewitness testimony,
which may be even more unreliable).
57
United States v. Coleman, 202 F. Supp. 2d 962, 968 (E.D. Mo. 2002)
(suggesting that Daubert only analyzes the logic of the evidence, not the
weight).
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Such a rule seems controversial, or perhaps even radical, at
first.58 Courts and the rules of evidence are typically not in the
business of requiring that litigants produce the “best evidence”
available.59 As Professor Richard Friedman notes, during a trial,
there is “no necessity that any single item of evidence be
particularly reliable, or even very powerful.”60 As a general matter,
litigants are free to choose the evidence they wish to present.
However, a “best science” rule—or as some commentators
have suggested in the tort context, a “better evidence
principle”61—should be neither controversial nor radical. As a
policy matter, the goal of promoting better evidence is well
established in many evidentiary doctrines.62 As a doctrinal matter,
fashioning a “best science” rule would practically require only a
slightly creative, but well-rooted application of the Rule 403
probative-versus-prejudice standard. The risk of unfair prejudice
with microscopy, as with any forensic technique, is that jurors will
be unable to detect inaccuracies or improper procedures, and that
jurors may give undue weight to the conclusions. The probative
value of microscopy, however, is more complicated. In the past,
58

For an informative exchange regarding the use of a “Best Evidence
Rule” in the scientific evidence context, see Edward J. Imwinkelried, Should the
Courts Incorporate a Best Evidence Rule into the Standard Determining the
Admissibility of Scientific Testimony?: Enough Is Enough Even When It Is Not
the Best, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19 (1999) and David L. Faigman et al., How
Good Is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 645 (2000).
59
As often taught in Evidence class, the so-called “Best Evidence Rule” is
extremely limited in scope and focuses only on original (as opposed to copies
of) documents when the proponent is seeking to prove their contents. See FED.
R. EVID. 1002.
60
Friedman, supra note 49, at 1057.
61
See Faigman et al., supra note 58, at 657-63 (discussing the contours of a
“better evidence principle” that would require more reliable techniques over
time as technology improves).
62
See Richard D. Friedman, Minimizing the Jury Over-Valuation Concern,
2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 967, 974 (suggesting that excluding some (less
desirable) forms of evidence may encourage “the presentation of better
evidence” in the long run). A thorough and insightful discussion of the best
evidence principle is offered in Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73
IOWA L. REV. 227 (1988).
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prior to the availability of mtDNA, microscopy had significant
probative value. Microscopic hair analysis was essentially the only
technique that could take advantage of hair evidence left on the
victim or at the crime scene. Exclusion of this evidence would
leave jurors with an incomplete picture. But as mtDNA becomes
cheaper and more widely available,63 the discounted probative
value of microscopy becomes vanishingly small.64 For most cases,
microscopy adds nothing to the information that an mtDNA
analysis already provides.65 This change in the probative value of
microscopy seems sufficient to render it inadmissible on Rule 403
grounds, while simultaneously explaining why microscopy was
admissible in the past.
3. Admissibility Versus Weight
Why should courts become involved in the relative merits of
different forms of forensic evidence? Ordinarily, sketchy evidence
is punished through cross-examination. The way to attack
microscopy’s unreliability thus could be through the normal trial
process, not through exclusion. Indeed, long before mtDNA
63

See Scanlon, supra note 17, at 8B (describing a new mtDNA-based test
that promises to reduce mtDNA testing from $4,000 per sample to $100).
64
See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182-84 (1997) (holding
that the calculation of probative value may involve comparing evidentiary
alternatives). While the concept of discounted probative value is well
established, FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note (“The availability of
other means of proof may also be an appropriate factor.”), its use in the mtDNA
context could arguably require an extension of current doctrine, since the
“availability” of mtDNA evidence as an alternative to microscopy may require
additional testing in a given case.
65
Naturally, in those cases in which microscopy offers uniquely probative
information or mtDNA is for some reason inconclusive, these special
circumstances could be accounted for in the 403 balancing. Cf. Berger, supra
note 14, at 1134 (noting that because hair examiners have some proficiency,
there may be some contexts in which microscopy should be allowed).
The current problem is that such an inquiry is rarely made. See Imwinkelried,
supra note 38, at 61 (complaining that “[r]epeatedly, courts have permitted the
prosecution analyst to express an opinion based on conventional microscopy
without demanding any explanation for the analyst’s failure to use more
specific, sophisticated techniques”).
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analysis even existed, Professor Edward Imwinkelried argued that
defense attorneys should complain to juries that prosecutors were
not using newer and more sophisticated methods of hair analysis.66
Good reasons exist for why courts should treat forensic and other
scientific evidence more carefully.67 While we may reasonably
expect the average defense attorney to have the tools necessary to
attack a lay witness’s credibility or perceptive powers, we cannot
necessarily assume that counsel will be familiar with the
weaknesses of each specialized forensic tool. Even if defense
attorneys were adequately well versed, their cross-examination
would be a feeble parry against the forensic expert, whose
qualifications and reputation in popular culture lend him an aura of
infallibility. A more effective rejoinder for the defense would be to
introduce an opposing expert but, as we all know, experts can be
prohibitively expensive and are often unavailable to indigent
defendants.68 While the Supreme Court has constitutionally
required court-appointed experts in certain limited contexts,69
experts remain elusive for defendants.70
Even with a science-oriented defense attorney and a highpriced mtDNA expert, the damage from the prosecution’s
66

Imwinkelried, supra note 38, at 45, 58–59; id. at 64 (suggesting that
reasonable doubt might be created if defense counsel “called the jury’s attention
to the fact that the prosecution neglected to use more reliable and sophisticated
techniques”). For articles on more advanced, non-mtDNA-based hair analysis
techniques, see Smith & Goodman, supra note 35, at 228 n.2, and Imwinkelried,
supra note 38, at 45–58.
67
But see Friedman, supra note 49, at 1064–65 (noting that judicial
comment may be more appropriate than exclusion as a safeguard against
unreliable scientific evidence).
68
Giannelli, supra note 54, at 111 (citing a 1990 study showing that judges
often denied requests for experts); see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA
TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 147 (1992) (“When the prosecutor proposes
to use DNA typing evidence or when it has been used in the investigation of the
case, an expert should be routinely available to the defendant.”).
69
See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83–84 (1985) (establishing a
constitutional right to a psychiatric expert in cases in which sanity and future
dangerousness are in issue).
70
Giannelli, supra note 54, at 110 (criticizing the disparity of resources for
expert testimony in criminal cases and noting that FBI forensic services are free
for prosecutors).
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microscopy expert may be already done. Jurors will be left to
choose between warring experts—one proclaiming the reliability
of microscopy and the other deriding it—an unenviable task often
noted by courts and commentators alike. Excluding forms of
forensic evidence that are not the “best science” available would
preclude such battles of experts.
IV. PRIVACY AND MTDNA DATABANKS
Beyond the evidentiary issues outlined above, mitochondrial
DNA also raises an interesting privacy issue in the area of
databanking. The FBI and all fifty states currently maintain DNA
databases.71 These databases contain nuclear DNA profiles from
convicts, crime scenes, and unidentified bodies as well as DNA
profiles that are contributed voluntarily by relatives of missing
persons.72 Police use these databases to find suspects, identify
bodies, and convict defendants, and the databases have quickly
proven to be invaluable tools for law enforcement.
Congress, however, has sought to protect privacy values by
limiting just whose DNA the government can databank. Under
federal law, the FBI is required to expunge a person’s DNA if his
conviction is overturned, and states are required to behave
similarly if they wish to have access to the national database.73
These provisions express a policy determination that, while the
police may collect (and presumably databank) DNA from arrestees
and those for whom they have probable cause,74 only the DNA of
convicts and voluntary contributors should be kept permanently.
The success of the nuclear DNA databank has naturally led to
71

Robin C. Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of
State DNA Database Statutes, 76 A.L.R.5th 239, §2[b] (2000) (noting that all
fifty states have created DNA databases); Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks:
Law Enforcement’s Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767,
783 (1999) (reporting that states databank the DNA of sex offenders).
72
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) (2004) (tasking the FBI with
establishing a database of DNA from convicts, crime scenes, and unidentified
bodies, as well as DNA voluntarily contributed by relatives of missing persons).
73
Id. § 14132(d)(1) & (2) (2004).
74
See Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 13, at 418–22 (discussing the
various standards used to assess the validity of DNA sampling by the police).
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the development of an mtDNA databank, which would be used for
similar purposes.75 However, because mtDNA has maternal
linkage, banking mtDNA has privacy implications that extend
beyond that particular convict.76 If officials run an mtDNA search
on material found at a crime scene and find a “hit” in the database,
that offender and all of his maternal relatives would become instant
suspects.77 As such, the privacy interests of those maternal
relatives will be difficult to protect. Any attempt to limit the use of
the “hit” to the person banked would be tantamount to unringing a
bell.78
Interestingly, the family-member privacy problem does not
seem exclusive to mtDNA databanks. Nuclear DNA is shared,
albeit not perfectly, between parents, children, and relatives.
Consequently, blood relatives share significant portions of their
DNA profiles, therefore raising similar privacy problems when
officials exploit near-matches of nDNA database searches.79

75

Fisher, supra note 8, at 3-4 (discussing the MitoSearch and CODISmt
software systems for searching the national mtDNA database).
76
Hibbert, supra note 71, at 783 (arguing that mtDNA databanking “has
implications not only for the banked offender, but also for his or her non-banked
relatives”).
77
Eric T. Juengst, Symposium: I-DNA-Fication, Personal Privacy, and
Social Justice, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61, 80 (1999) (suggesting that the
“appearance of [maternal] family members in an arrestee database might even
make them immediate suspects for investigation”).
78
Id. at 81 (recommending that banked DNA should only be used against
the person banked).
79
An example of this problem can be found in the facts of Flowers v. State,
654 N.E.2d 1124 (Ind. 1995), in which the police initially suspected the
defendant’s brother and obtained a warrant for his blood. Id. at 1124. When
nDNA tests showed that the brother was not involved, but that a close relative
was, police obtained a warrant for the defendant’s blood and found a match. Id.
The Indiana Supreme Court ultimately reversed the defendant’s conviction on
other grounds. Id. at 1125.
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CONCLUSION
Mitochondrial DNA promises to be a powerful new forensic
tool for identifying offenders and obtaining more accurate
convictions. Its chief benefit will likely be as a more reliable and
precise replacement for traditional microscopic hair analysis,
which has been widely criticized as being too subjective, prone to
error, and of unknown probative value. As a result, police and
forensic investigators will be able to continue using crime-scene
hair—often important physical evidence—but with a more
scientifically rigorous technique.
To ensure mtDNA’s proper use, however, judges will need to
remain vigilant. As with any scientific evidence, the court’s role as
gatekeeper requires that it determine not only that mtDNA analysis
is based on reliable principles and procedures, but also that those
procedures have been followed. In addition, jurors must understand
that mtDNA lacks the resolving power of nuclear DNA.
Mitochondrial DNA profiles are not unique, but are instead
distributed in small numbers throughout the population. Moreover,
maternal relatives all share the same mtDNA profile, making
mtDNA far less probative in cases involving multiple suspects
from the same family.
Finally, due to its maternal links, mtDNA will raise interesting
privacy concerns as mtDNA databases grow in size. Using an
mtDNA hit as grounds for suspicion against all maternal relatives
of a banked person implicates some of the privacy interests
Congress sought to protect when it placed restrictions on the
national DNA database. How courts will wrestle with that
seemingly intractable problem remains an open question.

